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The law administered in courts of justice may at times not unfairly
be styled a system of intellectual knots and puzzles from which may be
untangled with some difficulty and delay the rule of action which
should have governed the original conduct of the parties to a law suit.
Courts which are limited in their review to questions of law exist "not
that individual suitors might secure their rights, but that the law should
be uniformly settled, to the end that the people might understand the
principles which regulated their dealings and conduct."'- Law thus
laid down for our guidance is neither the rule of right, justice, nor
morals although it has a not remote kinship to each. It may be
immoral yet legally binding, as conduct may be immoral yet legally
unobjectionable. Sound decisions are, however, based on justice, and
amid the confused, arbitrary and artificial decisions of indifferent,
stupid, hasty, or biased judges handed down from the remote days of
the Year Books, stand out fundamental principles of good conduct as
elementary as the Ten Commandments and as eternal as Nature. Only
as law approximates such a standard does it establish its right to exist,
nor would our common law have existed through centuries if it had
consistently departed from such a standard.
Justice without law being a helpless thing so far as governmental
sanctions go, the lawyer turns to cases, preferably old cases, for a rule
of action to apply to a state of facts. Even when he comes to inter-
pret a remedial or clarifying statute, like the Bills of Exchange Act, he
roams "over a vast number of authorities in order to discover what
the law was, extracting it by a minute critical examination of the prior
decisions." 3 The inertia of a judicial decision often carries it along for
some distance before the external force of a corrective statute acts
upon it.4 The lawyer conceives his proper course to be to maintain the
law unaltered though the purpose of the statute is frustrated. "Cer-
tainty is a matter of quietness and repose, and uncertainty the cause of
variance and contentions."
To an outsider like Mr. H. G. Wells who "contemplates the law and
1 Martin, J., in Reed v. McCord (1899) I6o N. Y. 330, 335, 54 N. E. 737, 738.
'Walter Clark (Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of North Carolina) Some
Myths of the Law.
'Lord Herschell in Bank of England v. Vagliano [1891, H. L.] A. C. xo7, '45.
"Kelso & Co. v. Ellis (i918) 224 N. Y. 528, 536, 121 N. E. 364, 366.
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lawyers of to-day with a temperamental lack of appreciation," law
based on "the traditionary line of decisions" is "a very impracticable and
antiquated method indeed." He who becomes involved in it, contrast-
ing its precedents with the rules that govern his business and social
world, condemns its jangling formulas as being out of tune with com-
mon sense and sound judgment and finds no better basis for its com-
mands than the arrested development of "the customs of our bar-
barous and semi-barbarous ancestors." Even jurists from whom more
understanding and consequently more forbearance might be expected
have been known to jeer at their fostering mother.
The power to expound the law often develops in courts and judges
a respect for their own mere working theories which confuses a judicial
reason for a rule of liability with the laws of nature and the laws of
God. Thus Chief-Justice Cullen in Ives v. S. Buffalo Ry. Co.,6 consid-
ering workmen's compensation laws as basically impossible because they
impose liability without fault, said:
"I am not impressed with the argument that 'the common law
imposed upon the employee entire responsibility for injuries arising out
of the necessary risks or dangers of the employment. The statute
before us merely shifts such liability upon the employer.'7  It is the
physical law of nature, not of government, that imposes upon one meet-
ing with an injury, the suffering occasioned thereby. Human law can-
not change that. All it can do is to require pecuniary indemnity to the
party injured, and I know of no principle on which one can be com-
pelled to indemnify another for loss unless it is based upon contractual
obligation or fault. It might as well be argued in support of a law
requiring a man to pay his neighbor's debts, that the common law
requires each man to pay his own debts, and the statute in question was
a mere modification of the common law so as to require each to pay his
neighbor's debts."
Such reasoning would have checked the natural development of society
if it had been carried to a logical conclusion, but the Court receded from
its consequences with good grace after an amendment to the State Con-
stitution which still left the due process clause of the Federal Constitu-
tion in the path of the Statute." It justified itself with a distinction
between two statutes resting on no very substantial difference,9 and
even went the limit and applied the Statute to cases arising out of inter-
state commerce and in the exclusive admiralty jurisdiction of the United
States.10
i The Outline of History (192o) 616.
(1911) 2O N. Y. 271, 318, 94 N. E. 431, 449.
'Ives v. S. Buffalo Ry. (igio, Sup. Ct.) 68 Misc. 643, 646, 124 N. Y. Supp. 92o,
923.
'Matter of Jensen v. Southern Pacific (1915) 215 N. Y. 514, 1O9 N. E. 6oo.
9Arizona Employers' Liability Cases (919) 250 U. S. 400, 39 Sup. Ct. 553.
" Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen (1915) 215 N. Y. 514, iog N. E. 600, reversed
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The law courts are of an ancient lineage with too much pride of
ancestry to please extreme democratic ideas. The judges often look
backward rather than forward. All this'is reprehensible and distaste-
ful to advanced thought, intolerant of restraint, yet those who are
zealous to give the old dog Law a bad name and bring him into dis-
repute preparatory to getting rid of the beast entirely should not be
heard too credulously. Their motives are not always disinterested nor
do they possess the patience with authority that stays rebellion and
confusion. Case law is not wholly bound by the rules of past genera-
tions. It is a "myth of the law" that stare decisis is impregnable or is
anything more than a salutary maxim to promote justice. Although
"certainty is the very essence of the law," the law may be changed by
the courts by reversing or modifying a rule when the rule has been
demonstrated to be erroneous either through failure of adequate pre-
sentation of proper consideration, or consideration out of due time of
the earlier case, or when "through changed conditions it has become
obviously harmful or detrimental to society."'" Speaking of the New
York Sales of Goods in Bulk Act,12 which was held unconstitutional in
1905,13 Judge Cardozo said in I916:"4
"We think it is our duty to hold that the decision in Wright v. Hart
is wrong. .... The needs of successive generations may make
restrictions imperative to-day which were vain and capricious to the
vision of times past. Back of this legislation, which to a majority of
the judges who decided Wright v. Hart seemed arbitrary and purpose-
less, there must have been a real need. We can see this now, even
though it may have been obscure before. Our past decision ought not
to stand in opposition to the uniform convictions of the entiize judiciary
of the land. Least of all should it stand when rendered by a closely
divided court against the earnest protest of distinguished judges .....
The present statute is similar in essentials to the one condemned in
1905. In details it may be distinguished from the earlier one, but the
details are in reality trifling. We cannot without a sacrifice of candor
rest our judgment upon them. We think we ought not to do so. We
should adopt the argument and the conclusion of the dissenting judges
in Wright v. Hart, and affirm the validity of the statute on which the
plaintiff builds his rights."
The unqualified blunt ingenuousness of this opinion is unusual. The
Court sometimes reaches the same result as in the Workmen's Com-
pensation Law cases, with more caution and with lip service to the
(1917) 244 U. S. 205,'37 Sup. Ct. 524; Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart (1919)
226 N. Y. 3o2, 123 N. E. 382, reversed (192o) 253 U. S. I49, 40 Sup. Ct. 438.
' 1See Pollock v. Farners' Loan & Trust Co. (1895) 57 U. S. 429, 15 Sup. Ct
673; Pral v. Burckhartt (1921, Ill.) 132 N. E. 28o; Matter of Greifenhagen v.
Ordway (1916) 218 N. Y. 451, 458, 113 N. E. 5i6, 518.
UN. Y. Laws, 19o2, cI. 528.
Ii Wright v. Hart (igo5) 182 N. Y. 330, 75 N. E. 404.
"4Klein v. Maravelas (1916) 219 N. Y. 383, 385-386, 114 N. E. 8og, 8io-81i.
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principle" of continuity of decisions. In People v. Williams5 the Court
had, with an air of grave judicial humor, asserted that as woman "has
come to possess all the responsibilities of the man, she is entitled to be
placed upon an equality of rights with man" and could not be arbi-
trarily debarred of her right to work in a factory in night hours. In
People v. Charles Schweinler Press,16 when a like statute came before
the Court after the decision of the U. S. Supreme Court in Muller v.
Oregon,17 it was said:
"It is urged that whatever might be our original views concerning
this statute, our decision in People v. Williams is an adjudication which
ought to bind us to the conclusion that it is unconstitutional. Whife
it may be that this argument is not without an apparent and superficial
foundation and ought to be fairly met, I think that a full consideration
* of the Williams case and of the present one will show that they may be
really and substantially differentiated and that we should not be and are
not committed by what was said and decided in the former to the view
that the legislature had no power to adopt the present statute."
A rile too lif6adfy stated may be narrowed by a later decision. The
happening of a prior accident at the place where plaintiff fell was held
competent proof in sidewalk negligence cases.' 8 But in a later ce 9
it was held that when the plaintiff fell on a hummock of ice caused by
a defect in the walk, proof of like accidents two years before was
incompetent because the ice was different.
The simulacrum of a rule sometimes appears in a judicial opinion.
Its efficacy may be dispelled by distinguishing facts from law, dictum
from decision, philosophy from judgment. Thus it has been said with
much propriety by the New York Court of Appeals, of claims against
decedents' estates, based on a contract for the distribution of the estate,
that such claims were dangerous and were regarded with anxiety by the
courts which lent an unwilling ear to the statements of what dead men
have said; that "the contract should be in writing and the writing
produced, or, if ever based upon parol evidence, it should be given or
corroborated in all substantial particulars by disinterested witnesses.
Unless they are established clearly by satisfactory proofs and are equit-
able, specific performance should not be decreed." 2  This language had
been adopted by'lawyers and judges, not as was designed, as a warning,
but as a rule of law and by its application claimants had had their
I' (i9o7) 189 N .Y. 131, 137, 8I N. E. 778, 78o.
(1915) 214 N. Y. 395, 410, io8 N. E. 639, 643.
(19o8) 2o8 U. S. 412, 28 Sup. Ct. 324.
Quinlan v. City of Utica (1877, Sup. Ct) ii Hun, 217, affirmed (0878) 74
N. Y. 6o3.
Gillrie v. City of Lockport (i89o) 122 N. Y. 403, 25 N. E. 357.
='Hamndn v. Stevens (19o3) 177 N. Y. 39, 5o, 69 N. E. 118, 121; Rosseau v.
Rouss (1904) i8o N. Y. 116, 72 N. E. 916; Tousey v. Hastings (19o9) 194 N. Y.
79, 86 N. E. 831.
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rights taken from them although the trial court believed, and declared its
belief that their witnesses told the exact truth, because their evidence
was not thus standardized. The Court of Appeals set the trial
courts right in McKeon v. VanSlyk. 2 1 It distinguished between
a real rule that the plaintiff in a civil case is never required to prove his
case by more than a preponderance of evidence and the simulacrum of
a rule that is in substance nothing more than a counsel of caution which
the trier of fact should heed when he weighs the evidence in an action
against an executor founded on a claim put forward for the first time
after the death of a testator.
22
The stability of legal decisions is often more theoretical than substan-
tial. In Lawrence v. Fox23 the rule was broadly stated, under the
mistaken notion that it was the settled law of England, "that where one
person makes a promise to another for the benefit of a third person,
that third person may maintain an action upon it," but at the earliest
opportunity the donee beneficiary was put out of court and it was held
that the third party could sue on the contract only where "there has
been a debt or duty owing by the promisee to the party claiming to sue
upon the promise.24 At the present time, turning again to Lawrence v.
Fox, it would seem the donee beneficiary as well as the obligee bene-
ficiary has at least a fighting chance to re-establish the earlier and more
convenient if less logical rule in its entirety.
25
Again, looking at a well considered dictum, it seems to have been held
in Corbett v. St. Vincent's School26 that the agents of the state, doing
the state's work, share the state's immunity from liability for their torts.
The recent case of Murtha v. N. Y. Homeopathic, etc. Hospital
27 states
the correct rule that "agents and contractors, though unable to impose
liability in such circumstances on the state oi its divisions, remain liable
themselves and this whether they act in person or by sub-agents or
servants . . . . Much that was said in the opinion" (in the Corbett
case), says the Court, "was unnecessary to the decision."
It would be futile to multiply instances to demonstrate the principle
that case law is not wholly a matter of precedernt; that much has been
said in deciding cases that is not essentially law; that case law, in a
qualified way at least, is a progressive science; that legal doctrines
deemed revolutionary a century ago are listened to respectfully to-day;
that the opportunity still exists for great lawyers to make great argu-
(1918) 223 N. Y. 392, 397, IT9 N. E. 851, 852.
See Matter of Shermn (1919) 227 N. Y. 350, 125 N. E. 546.
(1859) 2o N. Y. 268.
Vroonman v. Turner (1877) 69 N. Y. 28o.
' 5Seaver v. Rawsom (1917) i8o App. Div. 734, 168 N. Y. Supp. 454, affirmed
(1918) 224 N. Y. 233, 12o N. E. 639.
(1903) 177 N. Y. 16, 68 N. E. 997.
(1920) 228 N. Y. 183, I85, 126 N. E. 722.
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ments in the face of obsolescent decisions and for judges not only to
"hold fast to that which is good," as they must in all decency and
respect for their place, but "to prove,--i. e. establish the validity of,-
all things."2
Hard cases make bad law. A judge must have undue regard for his
own conclusions lightly to make distinctions in order to qualify author-
ity with his personal notions of right and wrong. On the other hand
the pursuit of justice in judicial decisions is not a joke. "'What is
truth?' said jesting Pilate, and paused not for a reply." Fiat justicia,
but what is justice? Steadily adhered to principles, or some man's
idea of what would be just and fair for the parties considering their
relative sex, wealth, good fortune and the like? The former, doubtless
as a rule are the better guide, but a decision does not, merely because
it is old, fetter the courts forever.
"Holy Bible, i Thessalonians 5:21.
